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Wertheim, Stephen.  Tomorrow, the World: The Birth of U.S. Global Supremacy.  Cam-
bridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 2020.  262 pages.  Hardcover, $29.95. 
 
Wertheim is a Research Scholar at Columbia University’s Saltzman Institute of War and 
Peace Studies, and deputy director at the Quincy Institute for Responsible Statecraft, and a frequent 
contributor to Foreign Affairs.  This book examines in great detail some of the internal discussions 
among the U.S. political elites as they envisioned America’s role in the pivotal years of the late 
1930s through the end of World War II.  The story of America’s rise to prominence in the post-
war era is widely known but Wertheim makes a valuable addition by delving into the thinking of 
American elites on the outside of government (such as Henry Luce and Walter Lippmann) as well 
as those working within the State Department and other Executive Branch agencies.   
There are three major themes in the book.  The first is that the well-known debate between 
internationalists and isolationists in the run-up to World War II was a false debate concocted by 
American elites who advocated intervening in the wars then underway.  They used the term isola-
tionist to refer to anyone who argued that the U.S. could provide for its security and prosperity 
without necessarily intervening in either Europe or Asia.  The claim is very well supported by 
direct quotation from speeches and documents.   
The second major theme is that attitudes toward the debate about intervention evolved as 
events unfolded in Europe (Asia was not a primary concern of American elites in this account).  
First the concern was how secure and prosperous could the U.S. be in a world ruled by Germany 
in Europe and Japan in Asia.  Once it became apparent that Germany was stymied by the English 
Channel and then by the Russian winter, the Americans began contemplating a world in which 
Germany was not the pre-eminent power in Europe, and would be massively weaker than the U.S.  
Then, the solution seemed to come into an informal alliance with the U.K. to make use of its power 
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and colonies to provide some order in the world.  Before long the alliance of partners became one 
with the U.S. the leading power.   
The third major theme is that for much of the war, American elites were not imagining 
what we know as the United Nations, but rather a condominium of cooperation between the two 
English-speaking allies.  Wertheim argues that American planners eventually moved to the uni-
versal membership U.N. model to accommodate the Soviet Union (who would be understandably 
upset by being outside of the Anglo-American alliance).  Moreover, he argues, the new organiza-
tion would provide cover for the American military supremacy that was going to be the power that 
enforced the international agreements after the war.  Partly as a result of this, the debate about 
joining the United Nations had none of the fireworks of the earlier League of Nations debate.   
The greatest contribution this very well-researched book makes is to open up the black box 
and allow readers to see how a concerted effort by foreign policy elites within and outside of 
government guided the U.S. from its standard Western Hemispheric posture, to the world’s 
preeminent power and shaper of international institutions.  Time and again, Wertheim suggests 
that those who explain U.S. behavior solely by changing events in the outside world, miss at least 
half the picture.  Yes, foreign developments surely affected the visions and calculations as the 
post-war discussions were underway.  But knowing that those unofficial discussions occurred 
while official government officials were occupied with fighting the war and maintaining the war-
time alliances, expands our understanding of the post-war developments.  Wertheim succeeds in 
explaining how the activities of non-governmental elites (in the Council on Foreign Relations; Life 
magazine; Foreign Policy journal, et al.) moved the U.S. into a position that prevented the country 
from returning to the Western Hemisphere, or bowing, once again, to the wisdom of the U.K.   
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One weakness in this analysis is the paucity of attention devoted to either Japan or the 
U.S.S.R.  The planners were overwhelmingly Eurocentric and perhaps did not perceive the Soviet 
Union as particularly European, though that changed once Germany invaded the U.S.S.R.  
Wertheim claims that the limited attention was a reflection of the myopic thinking of the time, but 
the analysis feels unbalanced or incomplete as a consequence.  
This book makes a substantial contribution to our understanding of this most critical period 
in American foreign policy history.  Less attention was given to the ways fascism was defeated 
and more given to how the era gave birth to a combined realist-liberal world. It is not hyperbole to 
say that we can see clearly the shadows of that period in today’s world.  Most Americans, elite and 
public, have not questioned whether the U.S. should maintain military bases around the world, and 
take responsibility for ensuring order internationally.  When things go bad as in Vietnam, Ameri-
cans reassess the role as the world’s policeman, but only someone like President Trump could 
bring into question our commitment to the liberal international order, as well as its realist counter-
part N.A.T.O.  This book encourages us to consider the American global role anew.   
 
Niall Michelsen, Ph.D. 
Associate Professor of Political Science and Public Affairs 
Western Carolina University  
Cullowhee, North Carolina 
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